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Abstract: This paper presents the results for  testing for causal relationship  between economic 
growth and  goverment spending for OIC  countries covering the time series  data 1970~2006. 
There are usually  two propositions regarding the  relation between economic growth  and 
government spending:  Wagner’s Law states that as GDP  grows, the public sector tends to 
 grow; and the Keynesian  framework postulates that public  expenditure causes GDP to grow. 
 The primary strength and  originality of this paper is that we  used aggregate data as well as 
 disaggregate data for Granger  causality test. By testing for  causality between economic 
 growth and government spending,  we find that government spending  does cause economic 
growth in  Iran, Nigeria and Tunisia, which  are compatible with Keynesian’s  theory. However, 
the economic  growth does cause the increase in  goverment spending in Algeria,  Burkina Faso, 
Benin, Indonesia,  Libya Malaysia, Marocco, and  Saudi, which are well-suited with  Wagner’s 
law.  
Keywords: granger test,  government spending, Wagner’s law,  Keynesian 
Abstrak: Makalah ini menyajikan hasil pengujian hubungan kausal antara pertumbuhan 
ekonomi dan pengeluaran pemerintah bagi negara-negara OKI dengan data time series 1970 ~ 
2006. Biasanya ada dua dalil/proposisi mengenai hubungan antara pertumbuhan ekonomi dan 
pengeluaran pemerintah yaitu pertama Hukum Wagner yang menyatakan bahwa pada waktu 
Produk Domestik Bruto tumbuh, sektor publik cenderung untuk tumbuh, dan kedua kerangka 
Keynesian mendalilkan bahwa pengeluaran publik menyebabkan Produk Domestik Bruto 
tumbuh. Kekuatan utama makalah in adalah peneliti menggunakan data agregat dan disagre-
gat untuk pengujian kausalitas Granger. Pengujian kausalitas antara pertumbuhan ekonomi 
dan pengeluaran pemerintah menemukan bahwa pengeluaran pemerintah menyebabkan per-
tumbuhan ekonomi terjadi di negara-negara; Iran, Nigeria, dan Tunisia dan ini  sesuai de-
ngan teori Keynesian. Sedangkan pertumbuhan ekonomi menyebabkan kenaikan pengeluaran 
pemerintah terjadi di negara-negara; Aljazair, Burkina Faso, Benin, Indonesia, Libya Malay-
sia, Maroko, dan Saudi, sebagaimana hukum Wagner. 
Kata kunci:  uji granger, pengeluaran pemerintah, Hukum Wagner, Keynesian 
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between economic growth and 
goverment spending has been a topic for re-
search in public finance and macroeconomic 
modeling (Easterly & Rebelo, 1993; Kolluri, 
Panik & Wahab, 2000. In public finance the re-
search studies have focused on understanding 
the causes of growth of the public sector. 
Whereas, the macroeconomic modeling has 
been on analyzing the short and long term im-
pact of government spending policies on eco-
nomic growth. Understanding the effect of gov-
ernment spending on economic growth gives 
an insight into the possible effect of fiscal ad-
justment policies on correction the fiscal deficit. 
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One set of studies has been directed toward 
assessing the effect of the general flow of gov-
ernment services on private decision making 
and, more specifically, on the impact of gov-
ernment spending on long-run economic 
growth. Especially, the Keynesian theory sug-
gest that government spending accelerate eco-
nomic growth. These theoretical models are re-
views so as to have an insight into their rele-
vance in explaining the impact of fiscal adjust-
ment policies on economic growth.  
According to the Keynesian model, gov-
ernment spending is autonomous and exoge-
nous (Branson, 1979; Levacic & Rebmann, 1991). 
Thus, government spending is identified as a 
policy tool to influence economic growth and 
short term output fluctuations. The Keynesian 
model stated that government spending cuts or 
the reduction of a fiscal deficit result in a de-
cline in aggregate demand an income directly. 
The further affect aggregate demand through 
the negative multiplier effect. The results of ef-
fect are a decline in economic growth and an 
increase in unemployment. 
The other set of studies has explored the 
principal cause of growth in the public sector. 
Wagner’s law is one of the earliest attempts that 
emphasises economic growth as the funda-
mental determinant of public sector growth. 
Wagner proposed three reasons why the share 
of government spending would increase in im-
portance as an economy grows. First, as indus-
trialization progresses public sector activity will 
substitute for private sector activity because 
state's administrative and protective functions 
would increase in importance during the in-
dustrialization process. State's role in main-
taining law and order as well as its role in ac-
tivities related to economic regulation is likely 
to become more pronounced due to the in-
creasing complexity of economic life and ur-
banization. 
Furthermore, in assumption in Wagner’s 
work, goverment spending would also increase 
as a country industrializes because of the high 
income elasticity of demand for these services. 
This means that as per capita income increases 
demand for the services mentioned above, 
which are usually provided by the government 
spending increases rapidly, raising the share of 
public sector expenditure in GDP. Finally, tech-
nological change and growing scale of firms 
would tend to create monopolies whose effects 
the state will have to offset. The remainder of 
the paper is organized as follows; a brief review 
of the related literature is in section 2. The 
methodology is presented in section 3, section 4 
describes the data and empirical results, and conclu-
sions are discussed in the final section. 
Empirical literature. The Keynesian model’s 
proposition that government spending affects 
output growth, empirical studies suggest that 
the composition of government spending de-
termines its impact on economic growth (Kol-
luri, Panik & Wahab, 2000). Ansari (1993) in his 
study of the applicability of Keynesian theory in 
Canada found an increase in government 
spending on health was positively associated 
with GDP growth. Ansari (1993) also observed 
that payments for government debt were posi-
tively related to GDP growth. In another study, 
Biswal, Dhawan, & Lee (1999) also observed 
that government debt repayments were associ-
ated with an increase in GDP growth. 
Despite the evidence highlighted above on 
the effect of government spending on output 
growth, government spending may have no 
effect on output growth. Ansari, Gordon and 
Akuamoah (1997) found that increase in gov-
ernment spending was not associated with out-
put growth in Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa, 
which their study to validate the Keynesian hy-
pothesis in those countries. Al-Faris (2002) also 
presented similar findings in his study of the 
relationship between government spending and 
economic growth using a Keynesian model the 
Gulf countries. 
Al-Faris (2002) found a negative relation-
ship between government spending and eco-
nomic growth in African economies may be at-
tributed to a number of factors. Government 
spending on defense, subsidies and wages has a 
insignificant impact on productivity and on 
output growth. Therefore, an increase in gov-
ernment spending on unproductively categories 
in not expected to result in the rise of output 
growth. Then, government spending in educa-
tion and health takes a long time before the ef-
fected on productivity and economic growth 
are realized. While, an increase in government 
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spending has an effect on output growth if the 
budget constraint is binding (Kweka & Morris-
sey, 2000). An increase in government spending 
when a government faces a soft budget con-
straint accelerates inflation and negatively af-
fects output growth. Thus, for an increase in 
public spending to have a positive impact on 
output growth, the fiscal deficit need to be con-
straint and budget constraint be binding  
Ram (1986) and Grossman (1988) found a 
positive relationship between government 
spending and economic growth, despite of the 
disaggregation of expenditures. Diamond 
(1989) observed that social expenditure exhib-
ited a positive significant impact on growth in 
the short-run whilst infrastructure expenditure 
had less influence (albeit positive). In addition, 
he found that capital expenditure had a nega-
tive influence on economic growth. He attrib-
uted this negative relationship to a long gesta-
tion period and inefficiency associated with 
these of public funds. Furthermore, Devarajan 
and Vinaya (1993) found a negative and insig-
nificant relationship between productive ex-
penditure and economic growth, while Lin 
(1994) found that nonproductive spending had 
a negative and insignificant impact on industri-
alized countries but a significant positive im-
pact for developing countries. 
Islam (2001) in his re-examination of Wag-
ner’s hypothesis for the USA found that the 
relative size of government expenditures and 
real Gross National Product per capita are 
cointegrated by using Johansen-Juselius’s coin-
tegration approach. Moreover, Wagner’s hy-
pothesis is strongly supported by the result of 
Engle-Granger (1987) error correction approach. 
Singh and Sahni (1984) use the Granger causal-
ity test to determine the causality direction 
between national income and public expendi-
tures in India. Data used in the study were an-
nual and deflated by using implicit national 
income deflator. The study finds no causal 
process confirming the Wagnerian or the oppo-
site view 
Finally, Abizadeh and Yousefi (1998) use 
South Korean data to test Wagner's law. They 
first conduct Granger type causality tests, and 
then estimate a growth equation and a govern-
ment expenditure growth equation by using 
annual data for the period of 1961-1992. They 
exclude government expenditures from the 
GDP to obtain the private sector GDP, and use 
this in their tests. After comparing the results 
from the estimations authors conclude that 
government expenditures did not contributed 
to economic growth in Korea.  
RESEARCH METHOD 
The methodology to be used in this study will 
be based from Granger causality model 
(Granger, 1990). This helps in avoiding the 
problem of omission of variables, which was 
existent in some earlier studies. These two vari-
ables are known in macroeconomics to be im-
portant in the determination of both economic 
growth and government spending. To use the 
causality test, the variables under consideration 
are required to be stationary. 
The Granger test will be used here because 
it is a very simple test, which has been widely 
accepted as a reliable test for causality between 
two variables. Almost all the studies mentioned 
in the literature review have used this test and 
this has shed more light to us on how the test 
can be used for economies of different sizes and 
situations. The procedure here is used to detect 
the causality in the context of both the bivariate 
model and multivariate model. The simplest 
Granger causality test is: 
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where ln Yt is the natural logarithm of real per 
capita GDP, and ln Gt is the natural logarithm 
of government spending. e't and u't are white 
noise error terms. The null hypothesis for equa-
tion 1 is that ln G does not Granger cause ln Y. 
This hypothesis would be rejected if the coeffi-
cients of the lagged Gs (summation of b'2i as a 
group) are found to be jointly significant. The 
null hypothesis for equation 2 is that 'ln Y does 
not Granger cause ln G'. This hypothesis would 
be rejected if the coefficients of the lagged Ys 
(summation of '2i as a group) are found to be 
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jointly significant. If both of these null hypothe-
ses are rejected, then a bi-directional 
In the error correction model, the relevant 
error-correction terms (ECt-1) are included in 
the standard Granger causality procedure after 
all variables have been made stationary by dif-
ferencing, which yields equations 3 and 4.  
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where is first difference operator, et and ut are 
white noise error terms. The independent vari-
ables are said to 'cause' the dependent variable 
if the error correction term (ECt-1) is significant 
(b3 or ǂ3 are nonzero) or the coefficients of the 
lagged independent variables (summation of b2i 
in equation 3 or summation of ǂ2i in equation 4) 
are jointly significant. However, if the series are 
not cointegrated, Granger test is carried out 
without the error correction terms. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
We apply the methodology described above to 
annual data from Algeria. Iran, Jordan, and 
Syrian over the period 1970-2005 and annual 
data from Benin, Burkina Faso, Conte Divora, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mo-
rocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi, and Tunisia 
over the period 1970-2006. The variables used 
and their definitions are as follows, Y is the 
economic growth and G is the total government 
spending. 
As a preliminary data analysis, all series 
are first checked for stationary. If the series are 
nonstationary, standard econometric techniques 
can lead to misleading results. Both the Phillips-
Perron tests for a unit root are performed on 
each individual series. Table 1 reports the results 
of the unit-root tests that allow of include in the 
test use test for unit root in level in first level. 
The results in Table 1 indicate that all the series 
are trend stationary. 
Before applying the Johansen’s cointegra-
tion procedure, it is necessary to determine the 
lag length of the VAR equation which should be 
high enough to ensure that the errors are ap-
proximately white noise but small enough to 
allow estimation, In this paper is chosen on the 
basis ofthe minimum value of Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion (AIC).  
Since the variables used in all the cases are 
non-stationary, I(1), we perform a cointegration 
test to find out whether a linear combination of 
these series converge to an equilibrium or not. 
Two series (variables) are said to be cointe-
grated if they each are non-stationary, at least 
I(1), and if their linear combination converges to 
an equilibrium. (Engle and Granger, 1987) This 
means that cointegrated variables have a long 
term equilibrium relationship. Johansen and 
Juselius’s (1990) cointegration method was used 
for cointegration analysis. The cointegration 
and causality tests were carried out only on the 
first-difference stationary variables, I(1). 
Johansen and Juselius, procedure test results 
are presented in Table 2  
The test statistics fail to reject the null hy-
pothesis of no cointegrating relation at 5 per 
cent significance level, except in the case of Al-
geria, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, Marocco, Nige-
ria, and Saudi. This indicates that in Benin, Cot-
eDivor, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Syrian and Tunisia there is 
no long run relationship between economic 
growth and government spending over the 
sample period. However, the two variables are 
found to be cointegrated in the case of Algeria, 
Burkina Faso, Indonesia, Morocco, Nigeria, and 
Saudi’s data. 
In the Table 3 reported that the Granger 
causality test results obtained by vector auto 
regression (VAR) approach for Benin, CoteDi-
vor, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malay-
sia, Pakistan, Syrian and Tunisia. The VAR re-
gression do not include error correction term 
since we find that the variables are not cointe-
grated for these countries. The Wagner’s hy-
pothesis is not supported for these countries. 
There is no evidence supporting the reverse 
hypothesis for CoteDivor, Egypt, Jordan, Ku-
wait, Pakistan, and Syrian. However, reverse 
hypothesis is empirically supported by Benin, 
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Iran, Libya, Malaysia and Tunisia’ data. The hy-
pothesis that growth of government spending 
does not Granger cause growth of economic 
growth is rejected at 5 per cent significant level.  
In the case of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Indo-
nesia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Saudi, the two se-
ries converge in the long run, that is lnG and 
lnY are cointegrated, standard Granger causal-
ity approach (VAR approach) can not be used 
to yield approximate result. So, in Appendix 1 
reported that we do the Granger test with error 
correction terms from the cointegrating equa-
tions included in a regression that also includes 
once differenced variables (Ʀ lnY and ƦlnG). 
Results are reported in Algeria, Indonesia, Ni-
geria and Saudi are found to be significant at 5 
per cent level over the different lag length of 1, 
2, 3, 4 years in one side. Furthermore, our find-
ing that there is causality link, one-way or two-
way, between economic growth and govern-
ment spending in Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi, 
dan Tunisian. However, the other countries are 
not causality link, like CoteDivor, Egypt, Jor-
dan, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan and Syrian. 
Table 1. Philip Peron Unit Root Result 
Country Variable Unit root statistic level First difference Degree of integration
Ln Y -2.660 -11.313* I(1) Algeria Ln G -2.786 -18.891* I(1) 
Ln Y -1.919 -11.396* I(1) Benin Ln G -2.316 -10.076* I(1) 
Ln Y -0.800 -6.891* I(1) Burkina Faso Ln G -6.223 -6.780* I(1) 
Ln Y -2.257 -19.880* I(1) Conte Divor Ln G -2.901 -8.244* I(1) 
Ln Y -1.385 -3.210** I(1) Egyp Ln G -0.322 -6.708* I(1) 
Ln Y -1.572 -11.172* I(1) Indonesia Ln G -2.227 -7.750* I(1) 
Ln Y -1.858 -21.634* I(1) Iran Ln G -1.825 -8.975* I(1) 
Ln Y -2.506 -9.111* I(1) Jordan Ln G -2.838 -22.750* I(1) 
Ln Y -1.819 -5.651* I(1) Kuwait Ln G -1.445 -6.245* I(1) 
Ln Y -1.169 -5.541* I(1) Libya Ln G -1.117 -6.951* I(1) 
Ln Y -1.884 -4.845* I(1) Malaysia Ln G -1.189 -5.727* I(1) 
Ln Y -2.132 -25.070* I(1) Marocco Ln G -3.633 -34.125* I(1) 
Ln Y -1.188 -8.753* I(1) Nigeria Ln G -1.320 -27.273* I(1) 
Ln Y -2.919 -9.187* I(1) Pakistan Ln G -2.206 -45.269* I(1) 
Ln Y -3.805 -13.428* I(1) Saudi Ln G -4.325 -14.257* I(1) 
Ln Y -2.455 -3.991* I(1) Syrian Ln G -7.306 -4.062* I(1) 
Ln Y -2.134 -17.268* I(1) Tunisia Ln G -1.799 -9.906* I(1) 
Note: * and ** denotes 1% and 5% significant level based on Mac Kinnon’s critical values 
In levels regressions constant and time trend were included into unit root regression 
In the regression with first difference only the constant was included 
Jurnal Ekonomi Pembangunan Volume 11, Nomor 2, Desember 2010: 149-159 154 
The findings of this study may be inter-
preted in several ways. To detect the hypothe-
sized causal relationship between national in-
come and government spending, rate of 
increase of the latter must be greater than that 
of the former, so that the share of government 
spending in national income increases over 
time. However, for some reason, if spending 
keeps on increasing at a slower pace than the 
pace national income grows at; hypothesized 
causal link between the two will be weakened, 
making it more difficult to detect the link in the 
data. According to Ansari et al (1997) spending 
pattern could be smoother because of the debt 
financing obligations that a government might 
have.  
Table 2. Johansen and Juselius’s Cointegration Test Results 
Countries Null Hypothesis Maximal –
eigenvalue 
statistic 
5% critical 
value 
Trace 
statistic 
5% critical 
value 
Algeria  
(lag 1) 
None 
At most 1 
19.110** 
3.493  
14.07 
3.76  
22.603** 
3.493  
15.41 
3.76 
Benin 
(lag 1) 
None 
At most 1 
12.857 
2.482 
14.07 
3.76  
15.340 
2.482 
15.41 
3.76 
Burkina Faso 
(lag 4) 
None 
At most 1 
20.740** 
10.126**  
14.07 
3.76  
30.866** 
10.126**   
15.41 
3.76 
CoteDivor 
(lag 1) 
None 
At most 1 
8.300 
1.163 
14.07 
3.76  
9.464 
1.163  
15.41 
3.76 
Egypt 
(lag 1) 
None 
At most 1 
4.677 
2.627  
14.07 
3.76  
7.304 
2.627 
15.41 
3.76 
Indonesia 
(lag 2) 
None 
At most 1 
15.313* 
6.058*  
14.07 
3.76  
21.372** 
6.058*   
15.41 
3.76 
Iran 
(lag 2) 
None 
At most 1 
6.120 
1.734   
14.07 
3.76  
7.855 
1.734  
15.41 
3.76 
Jordan 
(lag 3) 
None 
At most 1 
12.947 
1.717   
14.07 
3.76  
14.665 
1.717  
15.41 
3.76 
Kuwait 
(lag 1) 
None 
At most 1 
11.705 
2.056 
14.07 
3.76  
13.762 
2.056  
15.41 
3.76 
Libya 
(lag 1) 
None 
At most 1 
12.300 
1.428 
14.07 
3.76  
13.728 
1.428  
15.41 
3.76 
Malaysia 
(lag 1) 
None 
At most 1 
5.282 
4.029 
14.07 
3.76  
9.311 
4.029  
15.41 
3.76 
Morocco 
(lag 1) 
None 
At most 1 
15.304* 
2.426 
14.07 
3.76  
17.731* 
2.426  
15.41 
3.76 
Nigeria 
(lag 4) 
None 
At most 1 
16.637* 
0.307  
14.07 
3.76  
16.944* 
0.307  
15.41 
3.76 
Pakistan 
(lag 3) 
None 
At most 1 
7.110 
0.510  
14.07 
3.76  
7.620 
0.510   
15.41 
3.76 
Saudi 
(lag 1) 
None 
At most 1 
14.252* 
12.695**  
14.07 
3.76  
26.948** 
12.695**  
15.41 
3.76 
Syrian 
(lag 1) 
R=1 
R at most 1 
8.792 
2.262  
14.07 
3.76  
11.05487 
2.262454 
15.41 
3.76 
Tunisia 
(lag 3) 
R=1 
R at most 1 
11.352 
0.361  
  
14.07 
3.76  
11.713 
0.361  
15.41 
3.76 
 Notes: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level  
The Relationship between Economic Growth (Heri Sudarsono) 155
Inability of the government to increase 
taxes beyond a certain level would also prevent 
government spending from keeping pace with 
national income since how much the govern-
ment can increase its spending is determined by 
its revenues. This argument was same with 
Peacock and Wiseman (1967), whereas that tax 
rates are fixed because of political and social 
forces, and then, the behavior towards tax rates 
would only change in a severe crisis such as 
war. In the absence of such a crisis or shock 
government spending will not increase unless 
Table 3. Granger Causality Test Result via VAR 
Lag length 1 2 3 
Null Hypothesis F-statistic F-Statistic F-Statistic 
LnG Benin does not Granger Cause lnY 
 
LnY Benin does not Granger Cause lnG 
3.389 
(0.074) 
5.320 
(0.027)**  
 
- 
 
- 
LnG CoteDivor does not Granger Cause lnY 
 
LnY CoteDivor does not Granger Cause lnG 
 
0.414 
(0.524) 
1.641 
 (0.209)  
 
- 
 
- 
LnG Egypt does not Granger Cause lnY 
 
LnY Egypt does not Granger Cause lnG 
 
2.280 
(0.140) 
2.646 
(0.113) 
 
- 
 
- 
LnG Iran does not Granger Cause lnY 
 
LnY Iran does not Granger Cause lnG 
 
10.735 
(0.002)* 
2.560 
(0.119)  
3.453 
(0.045)** 
2.592 
(0.092) 
 
- 
LnG Jordan does not Granger Cause lnY 
 
LnY Jordan does not Granger Cause lnG 
 
2.587 
(0.118) 
2.193 
(0.148) 
0.558 
(0.578) 
0.643 
(0.533) 
0.695 
(0.564) 
0.704 
(0.558) 
LnG Kuwait does not Granger Cause lnY 
 
LnY Kuwait does not Granger Cause lnG 
 
1.127 
(0.296) 
0.628 
(0.433) 
 
- 
 
- 
LnG Libya does not Granger Cause lnY 
 
LnY Libya does not Granger Cause lnG 
 
0.932 
(0.341) 
12.448 
(0.001)* 
 
- 
 
 
- 
LnG Malaysia does not Granger Cause lnY 
 
LnY Malaysia does not Granger Cause lnG 
 
0.896 
(0.350) 
4.948 
(0.033)** 
 
- 
 
- 
LnG Pakistan does not Granger Cause lnY 
 
LnY Pakistan does not Granger Cause ln G 
 
2.565 
(0.119) 
2.473 
(0.125) 
1.463 
(0.247) 
0.578 
(0.567) 
0.800 
(0.504) 
0.382 
(0.766) 
LnG Syrian does not Granger Cause lnY 
 
LnY Syrian does not Granger Cause lnG 
 
0.736 
(0.397) 
2.301 
(0.139) 
 
- 
 
- 
LnG Tunisia does not Granger Cause lnY 
 
LnY Tunisia does not Granger Cause lnG 
 
16.254 
(0.000)* 
7.346 
(0.010)** 
5.912 
(0.007)* 
2.911 
(0.070) 
3.198 
(0.039)** 
2.878 
(0.055) 
Note: Probability in (.) and * and ** denotes 1% and 5% siqnificant level 
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the demand for public sector services is highly 
income-elastic.  
Another way in which economic growth or 
industrialization could reduce the rate of 
increase in tax revenues, thereby making it 
more difficult to detect a possible link between 
industrialization and government spending has 
been noted in Ferris and West (1996). Kau and 
Rubin (1981) explained that due to economic 
growth a larger proportion of the labor force in 
a country might get transferred to less visible 
earnings and be able to avoid paying taxes. A 
specific example of a process that would gener-
ate such a transfer is urbanization, which in 
Kau and Rubin's framework is a measure of the 
larger set of opportunities available to closely 
located tax payers to avoid formal markets 
through such activities as barter.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper presents the results for testing for 
causal relationship between economic growth 
and government spending for OIC government 
covering the time series data from 1970 until 
2005 and 2006. There are usually two proposi-
tions regarding the relation between economic 
growth and government spending: Wagner’s 
Law states that as GDP grows, the public sector 
tends to grow; and the Keynesian framework 
postulates that public expenditure causes GDP 
to grow. The primary strength and originality 
of this paper is that we used aggregate data as 
well as disaggregate data for Granger causality 
test. By testing for causality between economic 
growth and government spending, we find that 
government spending does cause economic 
growth in Iran, Nigeria and Tunisia, which are 
compatible with Keynesian’s theory. However, 
the economic growth does cause the increase in 
government spending in Algeria, Burkina Faso, 
Benin, Indonesia, Libya Malaysia, Morocco, and 
Saudi are well-suited with Wagner’s law.  
Finally, judging from the above mentioned 
results, in terms of government spending, the 
causality test suggested that economic growth 
in OIC countries has more influence on gov-
ernment spending than the other way round. In 
other words, Wagner’s law is generally more 
prominent than Keynesian theory in some OIC 
countries.  
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Appendix 1. Granger Causality Test Results via Error Correction Model (ECM) 
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Appendix 2. Plots of Series of Economic Growth (Y) and Goverment Spending (G) 
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